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Introduction: Regulation and Oversight of Digital Campaigning – Problems and Solutions 
Dr Katharine Dommett, University of Sheffield, k.dommett@sheffield.ac.uk1 
Abstract: The regulation of digital technology is gaining increased attention within policy making circles. With 
growing recognition of the power held by digital media companies and the need to enforce democratic values online, 
policy makers are reviewing opportunities for oversight. Introducing a special section looking at the regulation of 
digital election campaigning, this article reviews the case for regulatory reform, the proposed type of regulatory change, 
and the practice of regulatory innovation. Noting the pace of digital change, it argues that there is a need to think 
more extensively about the design of any regulatory response in order to prevent systems of oversight from becoming 
obsolete. 
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Digital technology has become an engrained part of politics. As seen at the 2019 UK General 
Election, politics is increasingly played out online – with social media campaigns, advertising and 
video content providing important mediums through which politicians and campaigners can 
connect with citizens. As these techniques have been rapidly normalised as a part of contemporary 
political activity, it’s easy to forget how new the use of much of this technology is. Just five years 
ago, the Internet was being used in far less sophisticated ways. Political parties and campaigners 
were familiarising themselves with Facebook and Twitter, and online advertising was barely 
discussed. Indeed, the 2015 General Election was pronounced ‘the social media election that never 
was’. i Today, however, online tools are widespread, and it is not only politicians who use them. A 
range of individuals and groups, in the UK and beyond, can engage in political processes online. 
Whilst in many ways a boon to democratic politics, these trends have raised numerous concerns, 
with scholars and practitioners alike warning about the Internet’s wider implications. Whether 
pointing to the potential for foreign interference, data misuse or misinformation, there have been 
urgent calls to respond to what is often seen as a fundamental threat to democracy. 
In diagnosing this threat, much recent attention has been paid to the need for regulation, as there 
is recognition that existing systems are not equipped to tackle developments online. Whilst 
democratic processes are often subject to strict systems of oversight in the offline world, online 
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we encounter an unregulated political ‘Wild West’. This is because many electoral rules and 
oversight systems were written at a time when floppy disks and dial-up internet, not smart phones 
and extensive data access, were the norm.ii As a result, online political advertising, the role of paid 
social media influencers, geographically targeted messaging, and many other digital activities are 
currently unregulated. Faced with this reality, it is vital to think further about the need for 
regulation, exploring the boundaries of existing regulation, areas for possible change, and 
principles for shaping future regulatory practice.  
Within this special section, we focus attention on the significance of digital technology for the 
regulation and oversight of electoral processes, but the articles raise a series of questions about 
regulatory change that resonate with a range of other fields. The need to adapt and evolve in 
response to technology is a requirement of any regulatory system, hence the findings of these 
articles will be of interest not only to scholars of electoral politics, but also to those interested 
more broadly in regulation and policy change.  
The articles in this special section focus primarily on developments in the UK, but the question of 
online regulation has far wider resonance. As the use of technology continues to grow, countries 
around the globe will need to consider how to adapt or develop systems of oversight to account 
for the possibilities of digital technology. It is also not just individual countries that need to change, 
international organisations and alliances will also need to respond because digital technology is not 
geographically bounded. People can access the web around the globe and national borders do not 
operate online as they do in the physical world. As such global corporations such as Facebook or 
Google can change the rules of the game with limited recourse to particular national preferences, 
and individuals in one country can attempt to exert influence on democratic processes elsewhere. 
These possibilities mean that national governments need to work together to think about 
regulation, and that isolated national reforms are unlikely to eradicate problematic practices online.  
This special section brings together a group of leading experts who look at the issue of electoral 
regulation afresh. Each focusing on the challenge digital technology is posing for current systems 
of oversight and accountability, these articles map the impetus for change, the options for 
innovation, and the norms that should guide future regulatory practice. These pieces are informed 
by the scholarly and practical experiences of each of the authors, but also by a specialist workshop 
conducted ahead of this special issue. Sponsored by Political Quarterly, and hosted by the House 
of Lords Select Committee for Democracy and Digital Technology, the Turning Institute and the 
Crick Centre, we gathered together a group of regulators, platform representatives, third sector 
actors and academics for a two-hour workshop. Entitled ‘Regulatory Innovation: Identifying 
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regulatory strategies for responding to digital campaigning trends’ in January 2020. The session 
considered the challenges facing regulators, and the specific means by which regulators could bring 
about change. To foreground these contributions this introduction sets the backdrop to current 
debates, outlining the case for regulatory reform, the proposed type of regulatory change, and the 
practice of regulatory innovation. 
The case for regulatory reform  
In recent years, the case for reforming current systems of electoral regulation has been articulated 
not only in the UK, but around the world. Highlighting concerns with electoral integrity and 
democratic processes, developments on the Internet are seen to have rendered existing systems of 
oversight ill-equipped to uphold longstanding democratic norms. The idea of free and fair 
elections, an absence of foreign interference, and citizens’ right to privacy and consent are 
particularly seen to be under threat from developments online.  
Particularly notable when looking at recent debates around elections and digital technology is the 
widespread consensus for change. Whilst differing in precise prescriptions for what needs to 
happen, a vast number of politicians, regulators and civil society organisations have diagnosed an 
urgent need for regulatory reform. Indeed, reviewing recent inquiries in the UK it is possible to 
identify high profile reports from the DCMS Select Committee inquiry into ‘Disinformation and 
‘fake news’’, a new all-party parliamentary group on Electoral Campaigning Transparency, the 
Electoral Reform Society, the Constitution Society, the Law Commission, the Oxford Technology 
and Elections Commission and the Open Rights Group. In addition, similar reports have emerged 
internationally, with leading interventions made by the Kofi Annan Foundation and the European 
Commission.  
These reports differ in focus, but common to each is the idea, articulated by Kofi Annan, that 
because ‘technology does not stand still; neither can democracy’.iii In this sense, there is a need to 
continually update the processes for oversight and sanction that exist to uphold core democratic 
ideals. At present, however, existing structures are seen to lack the flexibility to adapt and 
accommodate to trends online. Often designed in a pre- or less sophisticated digital era, many 
existing structures are not able to easily accommodate recent developments. Whilst true for many 
regulatory systems, in the context of elections this rigidity is seen to be particularly problematic 
because technology has had a significant impact on the nature of election campaigns. 
Historically political parties have dominated the electoral process, being the key institutions 
through which political messages were disseminated and activism was organised. Whilst by no 
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means the only avenue for electoral engagement, systems of electoral oversight were designed to 
reflect the activities of these bodies, resulting in regulatory procedures focused on party and 
candidate financial reporting (to ensure parity in terms of resource expenditure). In addition, 
scrutiny of data use and consent procedures have tended to focus on major political institutions, 
with small organisations or isolated individuals not subject to systems of regulatory oversight (as 
their activities fall below reporting thresholds). With the advent of digital technology, however, 
the norms of electoral campaigning and activity have begun to change. Technology has made it 
easier than ever for individuals and small groups to organise and gain an audience for their 
message. With the emergence of social media channels, that provide low cost forums for 
advertising and organic message dissemination, individuals seeking to promote a political cause or 
belief can now organise more easily themselves. Whilst often previously reliant on established 
institutions (like parties) to get a message out, now people can communicate with ease. Moreover, 
their activities can be more spontaneous. Rather than needing to develop infrastructure through 
which to communicate ideas, individuals can now engage in what Helen Margetts et al. have called 
‘tiny acts’,iv dipping in and out of politics by using existing digital infrastructure. In addition, 
political systems have also become more porous, as it has become easier for citizens in different 
locations to play a role in politics beyond their immediate community. In this way, citizens in the 
south of a country can play a role in northern political campaigns, or people in different countries 
can use technology to try and influence electoral outcomes elsewhere. These changes have 
significant consequences for existing systems of oversight and accountability, as many established 
mechanisms are not designed to capture such actions and have few means by which to detect and 
sanction problematic activities. As such existing regulatory systems are not equipped to reflect the 
new reality of digital politics.  
Recognising these trends and their significance for current systems of oversight, much attention 
has been directed to the problematic practices that can be facilitated by the Internet. In particular, 
commentators have highlighted concerns about the capacity of digital technology to enable foreign 
interference, the promotion of mis- or disinformation, online harm (especially against children), 
hate speech, and financial misconduct (circumventing spending electoral limits by campaigning 
online). In this way, the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) select committee accused 
Russia of using technology for ‘meddling in elections and planting disinformation, in an attempt 
to ‘weaponise information’ and sow discord in the West’.v As a result of this threat, they called for 
the Government to consider ‘whether current legislation to protect the electoral process from 
malign influence is sufficient’, noting that ‘[l]egislation should be in line with the latest 
technological developments, and should be explicit on the illegal influencing of the democratic 
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process by foreign players’.vi In this way, new capacities are seen to be unlocked by digital 
technology that require an urgent response.  
Evidence of the precise impact of phenomena such as misinformation or microtargeted 
campaigning on electoral outcomes (and citizen behaviour) has, however, yet to emerge. Whilst 
academic work is currently underway to investigate the impact of these processes, emerging studies 
are far from conclusive and it is by no means clear that scholarship will be able to determine 
precisely what impact digital activities have. Whilst potentially lessening the impetus for regulation, 
it is important to recognise the significance of public perceptions. Recent public opinion research 
has shown growing levels of public concern about the possible impact of technology on 
democracy. The Electoral Commission, for example, have reported public concern about practices 
such as targeted advertising and data misuse, whilst other surveys have shown increasing unease 
about disinformation. These views matter because they have important implications for the 
perceived integrity of elections.vii It is vital for democratic systems to retain public confidence in 
order to maintain legitimacy and ongoing support, making it important for governments to tackle 
trends that may undermine public confidence. This line of thinking was advanced by the all-party 
parliamentary group for electoral campaigning transparency which argued that ‘[d]emocracy will 
only function if the public is confident that elections and referenda are being policed effectively 
and that the playing field is level’.viii In line with this thinking, an absence of concrete evidence 
around effect is not required to drive action, evidence of growing public concern alone indicates 
a need for reform. For this reason, there is widespread support for urgent regulatory reform that 
brings existing systems of oversight in line with the affordances of digital technology.  
The proposed form of regulatory change 
Having reviewed the case for change, it is notable that precise diagnoses of what needs to be 
altered vary. Indeed, a review of recommendations conducted by the author of 14 Government 
reports found 230 discrete recommendations relating to digital issues, and little consensus as to 
how regulatory systems needed to be updated to respond to technology.ix Despite this dissensus, 
there are, however, some principles or initiatives around which support has coalesced.  
First, recognising the rise of digital technology, many calls have been made for existing systems of 
regulatory oversight to be expanded to take account of the digital realm. As indicated above, much 
regulatory oversight was created in a pre-digital era and hence there is a need to expand regulators’ 
remit to cover developments on the Internet. In this way, the Electoral Commission have, for 
example, called for an existing provision for imprints on all offline campaigning material to be 
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extended to cover content online. This change would mean that all digital material would have to 
contain an imprint saying who is behind the campaign and who created it. Elsewhere, those 
campaigning for the regulation of online political advertising have called for existing principles 
regulating offline political advertising to be applied online. The Coalition for the Reform of 
Political Advertising, for example, have called for the regulation of online political advertising 
content by either expanding the remit of the Electoral Commission, the Advertising Standards 
Authority, the Election Committee of Ofcom, or by founding an alternative body. In these ways, 
calls have been made to update existing rules to reflect the online world by extending current 
systems of oversight. 
Second, and looking beyond existing systems, there have been some calls for the creation of new 
structures. Particularly focused on debate around the Online Harms White Paper, a number of 
actors have called for a regulator to be established that has new powers and regulatory remit to 
tackle problematic trends online. Envisaged to focus not just on elections and democratic 
processes, calls have been made for a new regulator that will implement, oversee and enforce new 
codes of conduct that will govern online environments and behaviours. It has been argued that a 
new digital regulator is needed to promote education and awareness raising about online safety, 
adopting a proactive approach to think about and address developments in the digital world. 
Looking beyond existing structures and systems of oversight, calls for this form of response have 
attempted to reframe how digital is viewed, focusing on overarching issues and concerns rather 
than seeking to update specific regulatory jurisdictions. 
Third, debate has also focused on the need for increased transparency, extending existing 
provisions to provide more information about what is happening online. Calls for transparency 
have been made by a number of different organisations. The DCMS select committee, for example, 
argued that what was needed was ‘the enforcement of greater transparency in the digital sphere, 
to ensure that we know the source of what we are reading, who has paid for it and why the 
information has been sent to us. We need to understand how the big tech companies work and 
what happens to our data’.x Elsewhere, the Information Commissioners’ Office called for a public 
information campaign aiming to ‘increase transparency and build trust and confidence amongst 
the electorate in how their personal data is being used during political campaigns’.xi This logic 
underpins calls for initiatives such as online political advertising archives which provide 
information about the number, cost and targeting of political adverts placed online. Whilst calls 
for transparency often request different kinds of information – variously specifying the need for 
greater financial, source, data and targeting information to be made availablexii – this response is 
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seen to be vital for allowing citizens to understand what is happening, and for the detection of 
problematic practices by civil society and regulators. Transparency is therefore seen as a means by 
which to secure greater accountability, ensuring that trends online are understood and can be 
effectively regulated.  
Whilst other specific proposals have been made, these three responses have dominated debate so 
far. Much attention has therefore been paid to which response can most effectively tackle 
problematic practices, with a raft of different proposals for change made. To date, however, limited 
progress has been made towards enacting change. Whilst the Government have committed to 
implementing digital imprints, and plans have been announced for OfCom to acquire new powers 
to act as the online harms regulator, little tangible change has been enacted. Considering this 
limited progress, it is interesting to consider whether responses to the challenges posed by digital 
could be made by regulators themselves, or whether governmental action is required to bring about 
change.  
The practice of regulatory innovation 
The practice of regulation is often neglected in debates around regulatory change and reform, but 
the question of how regulators operate and adapt is critical to thinking about the way in which 
digital developments can and need to be responded to. Whilst it can be easy to presume that 
regulators are equipped with the knowledge, skills and capacity to tackle new and emerging 
practices, this situation is by no means guaranteed. Indeed, it is likely that many regulators – that 
were created before the disrupting effect of digital technology – do not possess the specialist 
knowledge and skill set required to regulate developments online. Such competencies have to be 
fostered, but in order to determine where investment is needed and how regulatory competencies 
need to change, it is vital for regulators to adopt a future looking, anticipatory approach to 
regulation. In other words, regulators need to focus not only on performing their job in the here 
and now, but also need to invest time in thinking about the future regulatory landscape. Such 
thinking is vital to ensuring that regulators are clear about where future issues are likely to emerge, 
allowing them to reflect on where new skills and understanding need to be cultivated to effectively 
regulate such activities. 
In bringing together regulators at our workshop, these ideas were of keen interest to those in the 
room. Numerous interventions recognised the need to adapt regulatory structures and processes, 
building greater familiarity with digital tools and anticipating future forms of digital change. 
Evident not only amongst regulators, but also industry actors and civil society organisations, there 
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was a desire to think and reflect on how regulators themselves could change in response to digital. 
Whilst often feeling constrained in their ability to act pre-emptively, there was significant interest 
in examples of best practice, and widespread recognition that, as digital was not a static 
phenomenon, a philosophy of ongoing change needed to be engrained. 
Whilst discussed with enthusiasm within our workshop, it is, however, notable that limited 
attention has been paid to the need for such changes in the calls for reform discussed above. Whilst 
diagnosing problems and proposing (often legislative) solutions, few policy makers, civil society 
organisations or indeed regulators, have reflected on the need to change the way regulatory bodies 
themselves operate.  
In thinking about this gap, there are, however, a few examples of organisations thinking about the 
need for this kind of change. Recent work from Nesta, presented at the workshop by Chris Gorst, 
highlighted the need to think about ‘anticipatory regulation’. Whilst not specific to the realm of 
online political campaigning, or even to digital technology, these ideas suggest the importance of 
seeing regulation not as a fixed activity that oversees a particular, static set of phenomena, but 
rather as a dynamic and fluid activity where what is being regulated, and how regulation occurs 
shifts over time. To promote this form of regulation, Nesta argues that there is a need for 
regulators to adopt a flexible, collaborative and innovative approach that allows regulators to fight 
the present, rather than the last war. Outlining six principles, they argue that regulators needed to 
be: 
1. Inclusive and collaborative, in engaging the public and diverse stakeholders where new 
technologies and how they are deployed raise ethical issues, and in leveraging the 
capabilities of businesses, cities and civil society to secure policy goals.  
2. Future-facing, in developing resilient, adaptive strategies that can cope with the inherent 
uncertainty of fast-changing markets.  
3. Proactive, in engaging with innovators and innovation early in the cycle to provide 
predictability and enable timely, proportionate responses to issues that may scale rapidly.  
4. Iterative, in taking a test-and-evolve rather than solve-and-leave approach to novel 
problems, for which there may be no established playbook.  
5. Outcomes-based, in focusing on validating companies’ efforts to achieve well-defined 
goals, rather than setting rules, and particularly on incentivising platforms to support 
regulatory objectives.  
6. Experimental, in facilitating diverse responses to regulation of early-stage opportunities 
and risks, and where national or global policies and standards are still to be established.xiii  
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In a similar manner, DotEveryone have also called for a shift in how regulators themselves behave. 
Advocating for an ‘Office for Responsible Technology’ they have argued that there is a need to 
promote a future-looking regulatory approach that will ‘put UK regulators at the forefront of 
emerging regulatory approaches, shifting away from retrospective, command-and-control 
regulation towards the agile and intelligent approach digital technologies require’.xiv 
These ideas suggest that regulatory change doesn’t only arise from legislative reform, but can also 
result from a shift in regulators’ own practices. Within our workshop, a number of examples 
emerged of these principles already being put into practice. In relation to inclusive, collaborative 
working, for example, regulators reflected on the advantages of working together to address shared 
problems. The AI working group, for example, was cited as an example of good practice that 
brings together regulators and external experts to share information on how they are engaging 
with AI. Elsewhere, examples of sandbox events between regulators, industry representatives and 
experts were cited as a vital way of identifying, understanding and responding to emerging issues. 
Such practices suggest that examples of anticipatory practice can be found, and yet these activities 
were by no means universal.   
Whilst attracted to the idea of a future-facing, proactive regulatory model, issues of resource (in 
terms of staffing and finance), legislative remit, and capacity were seen to prevent this type of 
approach. Regulators reflected that they often lacked staff with specific expertise, and did not 
possess the resource necessary to hire those with computational and data analytics skills (who were 
often attracted to higher-paid industry posts). Alternatively, they explained that their legislative 
foundation inhibited their capacity to change by establishing tight remits and allowing limited 
opportunity to adapt and evolve. Additionally, some workshop participants reflected on the 
significance of regulator size, noting that larger, more established regulators often lacked the 
capacity to be nimble and adapt, making it hard to anticipate and proactively respond to 
technological change. What became clear, therefore, is that whilst attracted to the idea of more 
responsive regulatory practices, regulators are not always able to behave in this way. 
In reflecting on the practice of regulation, the workshop highlighted an often neglected element 
of regulatory reform, looking beyond a focus on threats and legislative response to consider how 
regulators may be able to change the way they operate. In emphasising this focus it is, however, 
evident from the above discussion that further reflection is needed to determine the barriers to, 
and opportunities for this type of regulatory approach. Whilst some examples of best practice can 
be found, it is clear that these principles are not entrenched regulatory norms. This makes it 
important to consider how regulators can change their activities and where governmental action 
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may be needed to encourage this approach. Such thinking is vital to ensuring that any response to 
digital technology does not only respond to present trends and activities, but looks ahead to 
develop future-proof reactions that are able to address technological developments we cannot yet 
foresee. Given that just five years ago, the Internet was seen to play a marginal and largely 
insignificant role in election campaigns, it’s clear just how quickly things can change. What appears, 
therefore, to be required, is a concerted evaluation of how regulation can continually evolve and 
change to prevent systems of oversight from becoming obsolete.  
The special section 
In the articles that follow, each author picks up upon the themes and ideas raised in the above 
discussion.  
First, Lisa-Maria Neudart examines the hurdles to regulatory innovation in the UK. Highlighting 
the need for reform caused by the algorithmic spread of nefarious content, non-transparent 
political advertising, obscure campaign spending and reporting and opaque data-driven 
campaigning, she discusses the significance of institutional structures, organizational processes, 
and regulatory functions for regulatory innovation. In conclusion, she argues there is a need for 
regulators to become tech-savy, to use evidence-based insights and to take an anticipatory stance 
towards technological change.  
Second, Jacob Rowbottom explores the regulation of third party campaigners. With growing 
coverage of the role played by third party campaigners in the recent 2019 General Election 
campaign, his article explores the history of regulation, tracing the complex web of existing 
electoral law. Considering the forms and consequences of future regulation, he casts light on the 
role of third party campaigns and the challenges of regulating their activity.  
Third, Sam Power explores the history of electoral finance regulation to draw lessons for debates 
around digital campaigning regulation. Focusing on the aims of regulatory reform, he considers 
the impact of increasing transparency around digital campaigning. Drawing lessons from the 
Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 he argues that more information can have 
perverse effects, and may in fact drive public concern. On this basis he asserts the need to think 
about the impact of future regulation and discusses the potential for reforms to have unintended 
side effects.  
Fourth, Ben Wagner explores the role played by electoral observers and considers the challenges 
they face in monitoring often opaque online election campaigns. Exploring the regulation of illegal 
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content he considers existing international regulatory efforts and reflects on the general and 
specific challenges of overseeing online activity. The article asks whether and how electoral 
observation should adapt to digital technology and considers the resources such regulation would 
need.  
Finally, Helen Margetts and Katharine Dommett conclude by looking at the possible avenues for 
regulatory reform in the field of digital campaigning. Diagnosing the need for a multi-layered 
approach, their article argues that action is needed from government, regulators, companies and 
civil society. Reflecting on the prospects for reform they make four recommendations designed to 
bring about change. 
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